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Abstract. Aiming for strong security assurance, recently there has been
an increasing interest in formal verification of cryptographic construc-
tions. This paper presents a mechanised formal verification of the popular
Pedersen commitment protocol, proving its security properties of cor-
rectness, perfect hiding, and computational binding. To formally verify
the protocol, we extended the theory of EasyCrypt, a framework which
allows for reasoning in the computational model, to support the discrete
logarithm and an abstraction of commitment protocols. Commitments
are building blocks of many cryptographic constructions, for example,
verifiable secret sharing, zero-knowledge proofs, and e-voting. Our work
paves the way for the verification of those more complex constructions.
Keywords: formal verification, cryptography, secure computation, com-
mitment, easycrypt
1 Introduction
The high and increasing volume of communication exchanged through insecure
channels, e.g. the Internet, confers increasing significance on security guarantees
of cryptographic protocols. However, the increasing complexity in the design
of cryptographic protocols leads to more complex and long proofs, making
them error-prone and difficult to check. In fact, it happened that protocols
believed to be secure, even for years, were found to be vulnerable to attacks
after further investigation [25, 2, 16, 34]. As a result, it is highly desirable to
have tools that can formally and automatically verify cryptographic protocols.
Recently, many tools have been developed based on different approaches for this
purpose [27, 26, 22, 3, 9, 18]. They have been proven to be effective in verifying
security properties and finding attacks.
Most of the automatic tools aiming to aid proofs for cryptographic proto-
cols [24, 29, 15, 33, 36, 17, 6, 37, 20, 32, 28, 5, 34] work in the symbolic model,
some providing computational soundness for special cases [7], while only few sup-
port the computational model [14, 12, 11, 4]. The symbolic model [19] describes
the real world cryptographic protocols abstractly. Messages are literals, therefore
it is difficult to model partial leakage. Cryptographic primitives are assumed to be
perfect and used as black boxes, which is not realistic. The adversaries strategies
are often predefined and limited to the inference rules provided, therefore the
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proofs are limited to case-by-case reasoning [8]. This overly simplistic way can
capture errors in the logic of the design, but cannot fully describe situations
in which the cryptographic primitives cannot be treated as black boxes and
when the security properties are defined computationally, which is often true in
cryptographic protocols and other fields of cryptography. On the contrary, the
computational model is more realistic when modelling cryptographic protocols
and can capture many low level details which are needed in proofs. Cryptographic
primitives are secure in the sense that computationally bounded adversaries can
break the security properties with only a negligible probability, if certain assump-
tions hold. Messages are bit strings and adversaries can be any polynomial time
probabilistic Turing machine. Therefore, it allows for reasoning with probabilities
and cryptographic assumptions. This allows for rigorous proofs that cannot be
obtained in the symbolic model.
In this paper we focus on proving properties of commitment schemes. Com-
mitment schemes are a cryptographic primitive that have been widely used by
its own or as a building block in other protocols, for example, verifiable secret
sharing, zero-knowledge proofs, and e-voting [30, 21, 35]. The high level concept
behind commitment protocol is intuitively simple, a committer wants to commit
to a message, while keeping it secret from a receiver until a later time when the
committer reveals the message to the receiver. In this paper we prove the security
properties of the popular Pedersen commitment scheme [31]. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first mechanised formalisation of this protocol.
Despite being a basic primitive in secure computation, to formalise it and have
a computer generated proof is far from trivial. In the security proof generated
by humans, many small gaps are left by the prover as they are easy to prove.
However, for a machine the gaps can be huge and extra efforts need to be spent
to let the machine complete the proof. In particular, to prove the perfect hiding
property, we created a sequence of games that vary slightly to allow the machine
to carry on the proof. This additional construction is totally absent from proofs
in the original paper and textbooks. In addition, to prove computational binding,
we constructed a discrete logarithm game to allow for reduction.
The paper is organised as the following: in Section 2 we review the related
work. In Section 3, we introduce the preliminaries. We then describe the formal
proofs in relation to the constructions, in Section 4. In Section 5 we conclude
and discuss possible future work.
2 Related work
To avoid the limitations of symbolic model tools and capture all the properties
of the cryptographic primitive, we used a tool allowing for reasoning in the
computational model. Some frameworks are available to work in such a model.
CryptoVerif [14] is based on concurrent probabilistic process calculus. Although
it is highly automatic, it is limited to prove properties related to secrecy and
authenticity. The tool gga∞ [4] specialises in reasoning in the generic group
model and seems promising when attackers have access to random oracles, which
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does not apply to our setting. Certicrypt is a fully machine-checked language-
based framework built on top of the Coq proof assistant [12]. However it is no
longer maintained. EasyCrypt [11] follows the same approach as CertiCrypt and
supports automated proofs as well as interactive proofs that allow for interleaving
both program verification and formalisation of mathematical theories. This is
desirable because they are intimately intertwined when formalising cryptographic
proofs, and can leave the tedious parts of proofs to machines.
Recently, a machine-checked formalisation of Σ-protocols to prove statements
about discrete logarithms has been developed in CertiCrypt [13]. A commonality
between the work in [13] and our work is that the Schnorr protocol proved in [13]
is also based on the discrete logarithm assumption.
3 Background
3.1 Commitment Protocols
Commitment protocols are two-party schemes between a committer C and a
receiver R, and run in two phases. Let M be the space of messages to commit
to. The first phase is called commitment phase, where the party C sends R its
commitment for a private message m ∈M and secretly holds an opening value.
The second phase is called verification phase, where the party C sends R the
original message m along with the opening value, so that R can verify that the
message committed in the first phase was indeed m.
Commitment protocols involve three efficient algorithms: (i) G (1n) which
outputs a public value h, (ii) C (h,m) which takes as input the public value h
and the message m, and outputs (c, d) where c is the commitment to send in
the first phase and d is the opening value to be send in the second phase, and
(iii) V (h,m, c, d) which takes as input the public value h, the message m, the
commitment c and the opening value d, and outputs true if verification succeeds
or false otherwise. Let pi = (G, C,V) be a commitment scheme, its security
properties are (i) correctness, i.e. for every message the commitment generated
is valid, (ii) computational or perfect hiding, where any attacker cannot learn
information from the commitment c about the message m with any advantage
(perfect), or with a negligible advantage (computational), and (iii) computational
or perfect binding, where the message m is uniquely bound to c (perfect) or
finding another message with the same commitment has negligible probability of
success (computational). We defer the formal definitions of these properties to
Section 4.
3.2 Reasoning in EasyCrypt
We present a brief overview of EasyCrypt. More information about Easycrypt
and the syntax of its language can be found in [10, 1]. Those who are familiar
with EasyCrypt can skip the rest of this section.
EasyCrypt handles the computational model, in which adversaries are proba-
bilistic algorithms. To capture this, we have modules that are containers of global
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variables and procedures. Procedures capture the idea of algorithm, and one can
reason about procedures running in a memory (as an execution environment). In
the computational model, one has to reason about the probability of adversaries
returning some specific results. EasyCrypt captures this idea as the probability
of running a procedure M.c in a memory m with post-condition Q evaluating
true, where M is the module containing the procedure c, written as
Pr[M.c(. . .) @ &m :Q]
To express and to prove properties, in EasyCrypt we use judgements (assertions)
in (i) basic higher-order logic for implemented theories, (ii) Hoare logic (HL),
(iii) probabilistic Hoare logic (pHL), and (iv) probabilistic relational Hoare logic
(pRHL). For the last three of them, there are concepts of pre-condition P and
post-condition Q, as well as procedures M.c, M.c1, N.c2, . . . , inside modules M ,
N , running in some memory m.
HL hoare[M.c :P ⇒ Q] - When P is true relating to some memory m and M.c
terminates in m, then after running M.c, Q always evaluates to true in the
(modified) memory.
pHL phoare [M.c :P ⇒ Q] < r - When P is true relating to some memory m
and M.c terminates in m, then after running M.c, Q evaluates to true in the
(modified) memory with probability less than r ∈ [0, 1] ⊂ R. Other supported
relations are the common relations =, >, ≥, and ≤.
pRHL equiv[M.c1 ∼ N.c2 :P ⇒ Q] - When P is true relating to some memory
m and M.c1 and N.c2 terminate in m, then after running them in two separate
copies of m, Q always evaluates to true in the corresponding memories.
In cryptography, security is usually defined by requiring certain properties to
hold for all adversaries. To capture the for all quantifier, in EasyCrypt, adversaries
are defined with abstract procedures, which means the adversaries can do anything
without any prescribed strategies. Working with abstract procedures may require
to assume their termination. In Easycrypt, the idea of termination is modelled
by the keyword islossless. We can declare a procedure to be lossless using the
following syntax:
islossless M.c
The statement is defined as a pHL judgement phoare[M.c : T⇒ T] = 1%r, which
means the procedure M.c always returns and terminates with a probability 1
(1%r means real number 1).
All the above constructions are useful for our formalised proof. In particular,
to prove the correctness we used a HL judgement, to prove perfect hiding we
used both pRHL to compare the hiding experiment with an artificial experiment
and a pHL to finalise the proof, and to prove computational binding we used a
pHL judgement to compare the binding experiment to the discrete logarithm
experiment.
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4 Formal Verification of Pedersen Commitment Scheme
In this section we show how we modelled the generic commitment scheme and its
security properties, the Pedersen commitment scheme and we prove its security
properties of correctness, perfect hiding and computational binding.
4.1 Modelling the Scheme
The abstract commitment scheme is modelled by the following few lines, proto-
typing the algorithms introduced in Section 3:
module type CScheme = { (* Abstract commitment scheme *)
proc gen() : value
proc commit(h: value, m: message) : commitment * openingkey
proc verify(h: value, m: message, c: commitment, d: openingkey) : bool
}.
The Pedersen commitment protocol runs between a committer C, holding a secret
message m ∈ Zq to commit to, and a receiver R who agrees on the group (G, q, g),
where q is the order of G and g is its generator, and is defined as the following:
Commitment phase
– R samples a value h ∈R G and sends h to C.
– C samples an opening value d ∈R Zq, computes the commitment c =
gdhm, and sends c to R.
Verification phase
– C sends the pair (m, d) to R.
– R checks whether gdhm matches to the previously received commitment
c, and either accepts if they match or reject if the do not.
We modelled the protocol in EasyCrypt as the following three procedures
inside the module module Ped : CScheme:
module Ped : CScheme = { (* Implements a CScheme *)
proc gen() : value = {
var x, h;
x =$ FDistr.dt; (* This randomly samples an element in Z_q *)
h = g^x; (* g is globally defined from the cyclic group theory *)
return h;
}
proc commit(h: value, m: message) : commitment * openingkey = {
var c, d;
d =$ FDistr.dt;
c = (g^d) * (h^m);
return (c, d);
}
6 R. Metere, C. Dong
proc verify(h: value, m: message, c: commitment, d: openingkey)
: bool = {
var c';
c' = (g^d) * (h^m);
return (c = c');
}
}.
4.2 Formalising security properties
The security properties we want to prove are correctness, hiding and binding.
The properties are captured by experiments, which are formally defined below
and modelled as in Fig. 1.
Definition 1 (Correctness). A commitment protocol pi defined by the triplet
(G, C,V) is correct if for all messages m ∈ M to commit, let h = G (1n) and
(c, d) = C (h,m), then V (h,m, c, d) = 1.
Loosely speaking, the verification done by the algorithm V of any message m
committed using the algorithm C will always succeed.
For hiding and binding, we have two different adversaries: (i) the unhider U ,
which plays the hiding experiment and has two abstract procedures, one to choose
a pair of messages, and another to guess which of the two messages corresponds
to a given commitment; (ii) the binder B, which plays the binding experiment
and has only a procedure to output two different pairs (message, opening value)
that bind to the same commitment.
Definition 2 (Hiding). Let pi = (G, C,V) be a commitment protocol. Then we
can define the hiding properties for each polynomial time adversary U .
(perfect hiding) Pr
[
HExpU,pi (n) = 1
]
=
1
2
(computational hiding) ∃µ (n) . Pr [HExpU,pi (n) = 1] ≤ 12 + µ (n)
where µ (n) is a negligible function.
Hiding experiment. The hiding experiment HExpU,pi runs as follows:
– The adversary is given the output of G and asked to choose two messages,
– the experiment randomly selects one of them and calls C to compute its
commitment,
– the adversary is asked to guess which one of the two messages the commitment
corresponds to, and finally
– the experiments outputs 1 if the guess of the adversary is correct.
A commitment protocol satisfies the hiding security property if no adversary
exist such that the probability of winning the hiding experiment is (significantly)
better than a blind guess. If this is true, the committer is guaranteed that no
information can be inferred by the commitment itself.
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Definition 3 (Binding). Let pi = (G, C,V) be a commitment protocol. Then we
can define the binding properties for each polynomial time adversary B.
(perfect binding) ∃µ (n) . Pr [BExpB,pi (n) = 1] = 0
(computational binding) ∃µ (n) . Pr [BExpB,pi (n) = 1] ≤ µ (n)
where µ (n) is a negligible function.
Binding experiment. The binding experiment BExpB,pi runs as follows:
– The adversary is given the output of G and asked to bind two messages to
the same commitment value, then
– the experiment outputs 1 if the two messages differ and the commitment is
valid for both the messages, that is if both can be verified by calling V.
A commitment protocol satisfies the binding security property if no adversary
exist such that the probability of winning the binding experiment is higher than
negligible. If this is true, the receiver is guaranteed that the value committed
cannot be changed.
Fig. 1. Commitment scheme properties. Correctness (top), hiding experiment (left) and
binding experiment (right) modelled in EasyCrypt.
module Corr (S:CScheme)={
proc main(m: message) : bool = {
var h, c, d, b;
h = S.gen();
(c, d) = S.commit(h, m);
b = S.verify(h, m, c, d);
return b;
}
}.
module HExp(S:CScheme,U:Unhider)={
proc main() : bool = {
var b, b', m0, m1, h, c, d;
h = S.gen();
(m0, m1) = U.choose(h);
b =$ {0,1};
(c, d) = S.commit(h, b?m1:m0);
b' = U.guess(c);
return (b = b');
}
}.
module BExp(S:CScheme,B:Binder)={
proc main() : bool = {
var h, c, m, m', d, d', v, v';
h = S.gen();
(c, m, d, m', d') = B.bind(h);
v = S.verify(h, m , c, d );
v' = S.verify(h, m', c, d');
return v /\ v' /\ (m <> m');
}
}.
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4.3 Proofs
Relating to the properties modelled in Section 4.1, the Pedersen commitment
scheme security properties we prove are correctness, perfect hiding, and com-
putational binding. These security properties rely on the existence of a group
(G, q, g) in which the discrete logarithm is hard to compute (discrete logarithm
assumption).
Correctness. Correctness in EasyCrypt is formalised with a HL judgement:
hoare[ Corr(Ped).main : T⇒ res]. Its proof is straightforward. The first step is
to unfolding the definition of Corr(Ped).main, which is the correctness algorithm
described in Fig. 1 instantiated with Ped illustrated in Section 4.1. Then we have
c = gdhm and c′ = gdhm which are always equal.
Perfect hiding. In the Pedersen protocol we prove the perfect hiding:
∀U . Pr [HExpU,Ped (G, q, g) = 1] = 12 (1)
In EasyCrypt, we modelled it with the following lemma:
lemma perfect_hiding: forall (U <: Unhider) &m,
islossless U.choose ⇒ islossless U.guess ⇒
Pr[HExp(Ped, U).main() @ &m : res] = 1%r / 2%r.
Where U <: Unhider is the adversary U with abstract procedures choose and
guess, of which we needed to assume they terminate islossless U.choose and
islossless U.guess.
Perfect hiding can be proved by comparing the hiding experiment to an
intermediate experiment in which the commitment is replaced by gd which
contains no information about mb. The experiment is described in Fig. 2.
We prove it by first showing that for all adversaries, the probability of winning
the hiding experiment is exactly the same as winning the intermediate experiment.
∀U . Pr [HExpU,Ped (G, q, g) = 1] = Pr [HIntermU,Ped (G, q, g) = 1]
In code,
lemma phi_hinterm (U<:Unhider) &m:
Pr[HExp(Ped,U).main() @ &m : res] = Pr[HInterm(U).main() @ &m : res].
To prove that, we unfold the two experiments in a pRHL judgement. The first
experiment is automatically instantiated by EasyCrypt as follows:
HExp U, Ped (G, q, g)
h ∈R G;
(m0,m1)← U .choose (h);
b ∈R {0, 1};
d ∈R Zq;
c← gdhmb ;
b′ ← U .guess (c);
return b = b′;
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Fig. 2. The intermediate hiding experiment is almost equal to the hiding experiment,
but the commitment is replaced by a random group element.
HInterm U, Ped (G, q, g)
h ∈R G;
(m0,m1)← U .choose (h);
b ∈R {0, 1};
d ∈R Zq;
c← gd;// msg independent
b′ ← U .guess (c);
return b = b′;
module HInterm(U:Unhider) = {
proc main() : bool = {
var b, b', x, h, c, d, m0, m1;
x =$ FDistr.dt;
h = g^x;
(m0, m1) = U.choose(h);
b =$ {0,1};
d =$ FDistr.dt;
c = g^d; (* message independent *)
b' = U.guess(c);
return (b = b');
}
}.
The proof is done by comparing the execution of the two experiments and is
based on the fact that the distribution of hmbgd is taken over gd.
Then, we prove that for all adversaries, the probability of winning the inter-
mediate experiment is exactly a half.
∀U . Pr [HIntermU,Ped (G, q, g) = 1] = 1
2
In EasyCrypt, we have:
lemma hinterm_half (U<:Unhider) &m:
islossless U.choose ⇒ islossless U.guess ⇒
Pr[HInterm(U).main() @ &m : res] = 1%r/2%r.
Combining the two lemmas, by transitivity, we prove perfect hiding for Pedersen
commitment protocol as in equation (1).
Computational binding. For the Pedersen protocol, we prove the compu-
tational binding property.
∀B. ∃µ (n) . Pr [BExpB,Ped (G, q, g) = 1] ≤ µ (n) (2)
where µ (n) is a negligible function. The proof is done by a reduction to the discrete
logarithm assumption. In cryptography, proof by reduction usually means to show
how to transform an efficient adversary that is able to break the construction
into an algorithm that efficiently solves a problem that is assumed to be hard. In
this proof, the problem assumed to be hard is the discrete logarithm problem [23,
p. 320]. We show that if an adversary can break the binding property, then it
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can output (m, d) and (m′, d′) such that gdhm = gd
′
hm
′
. If this is true then the
discrete logarithm of h = gx can be computed by
x =
d− d′
m′ −m.
Fig. 3. The discrete logarithm experiment (left) and an adversary reducing the binding
experiment with the Pedersen protocol to the discrete logarithm experiment (right),
where DLogAttacker(B).guess models A (B).guess.
DLog A (G, q, g)
x ∈R Zq;
x′ ← A.guess (gx);
if x′ = ⊥ then
b← false;
else
b← (x′ = x);
return b;
A (B) .guess(h)
(c,m, d,m′, d′)← B.bind (h);
if c = gdhm = gd
′
hm
′ ∧m 6= m′ then
x← d− d
′
m′ −m ;
else
x← ⊥;
return x;
module DLog(A:Adversary)={
proc main () : bool = {
var x, x', b;
x =$ FDistr.dt;
x' = A.guess(g^x);
if (x' = None)
b = false;
else
b = (x'= Some x);
return b;
}
}.
module DLogAttacker(B:Binder):Adversary={
proc guess(h: group) : F.t option = {
var x, c, m, m', d, d';
(c, m, d, m', d') = B.bind(h);
if ((c = g^d * h^m) /\
(c = g^d' * h^m') /\ (m <> m'))
x = Some((d - d') * inv (m' - m));
else
x = None;
return x;
}
}.
We capture the reduction by two modules in EasyCrypt (Fig. 3). A small
technical subtlety is that since the adversary is abstractly defined, it can return
m = m′ with some probability. This can cause division by zero. Therefore, we
check the output from the adversary to avoid it. Formally, the adversary assumed
to break the binding experiment is B and we construct an adversary A to break
the discrete logarithm experiment with equal probability of success:
∀B. Pr [BExpB,Ped (G, q, g) = 1] = Pr [DLogA(B) (G, q, g) = 1]
The above is captured in EasyCrypt by the lemma:
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lemma computational_binding: forall (B <: Binder) &m,
Pr[BExp(Ped, B).main() @ &m : res] =
Pr[DLog(DLogAttacker(B)).main() @ &m : res].
To prove the lemma, we unfolded the experiments as much as possible, i.e. up
to abstractions, in a pRHL judgement which created an equivalence of the two
experiments in the sense illustrated in Section 3.2. The binding experiment is
automatically unfolded to the following.
BExp B, Ped (G, q, g)
h ∈R G;
(c,m, d,m′, d′)← B.bind (h);
v ← c = gdhm
v′ ← c = gd′hm′
return v ∧ v′ ∧m 6= m′;
The automatic tactics could not automatically prove the lemma, as the
expression (d− d′) / (m′ −m) used by the attacker A (modelled as DLogAttacker)
in the DLog experiment was too complex to be automatically used by the prover
into the binding experiments and needed to be manually guided.
Assuming that the discrete logarithm is hard, then the probability of the
experiment BExpB,Ped (G, q, g) returning 1 must be negligible. Finally,
∀B. ∃µ (n) . Pr [BExpB,Ped (G, q, g) = 1] ≤ µ (n)
which is the definition of computational binding we gave in equation (2).
5 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we showed how EasyCrypt can be used for formally verifying
practical cryptographic primitives and automatising mechanised proofs. With a
game based approach, we could construct fully mechanised proofs of the security
properties of the Pedersen commitment protocol, a building block primitive for
many cryptographic protocols.
Composability is a desirable property of cryptographic protocols. When de-
signing a protocol, we often want to guarantee that the composition of the
protocol does not break the required security properties. In cryptography, ad-
vanced theories like Universal Composability have been proposed. As a future
work, we will investigate how to enable machine-aided proofs for composability.
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